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WHO OWNS THE BEACH?
MASSACHUSETTS REFUSES TO JOIN
THE TREND OF INCREASING PUBLIC
ACCESS
The right of the public to use ocean beaches has recently received
widespread attention. Most state courts have found extensive public
rights to beach access, but only at the expense of the private beachfront
owner.' In In re Opinion of the Justices,2 an advisory opinion 3 rendered
in response to a question propounded by the Massachusetts House of
Representatives, 4 however, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts ruled that a proposed statute5 creating an on-foot free right of
passage along the beach between the line of mean high tide and extreme
low tide would violate the constitutional prohibition against taking
private property without compensation. 6 Although the court found
1. See notes 10-40 and accompanying text infra. This comment is limited to the law of
ocean beaches. For a discussion of problems related to lakeshore access see Note, Waters
and Watercourses - Right of Public Passage Along Great Lakes Beaches, 31 MIcH. L. REv.
1134 (1933); 2 Wis. L. REv. 377 (1924).
2. - Mass. -, 313 N.E.2d 561 (1974).
3. It has been uniformly and many times held that such opinions, although
necessarily the result of judicial examination and deliberation, are advisory in
nature, given by the justices as individuals in their capacity of constitutional
advisers of the other departments of government and without the aid of arguments,
are not adjudications by the court, and do not fall within the doctrine of stare
decisis.
Commonwealth v. Welosky, 276 Mass. 398, 400, 177 N.E. 656, 658 (1931).
4. The court gave an affirmative response to the following question: "Would the
pending Bill if enacted into law violate Article X of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of
the Commonwealth or the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States?" - Mass. at -, 313 N.E.2d at 565.
5. The bill (House No. 481) was entitled "An Act authorizing public right-of-passage
along certain coastline of the Commonwealth." Section 1 provided "It is hereby declared
and affirmed that the reserved interests of the public in the land along the coastline of the
commonwealth include and protect a public on-foot free right-of-passage along the shore
of the coastline between the mean high water line and the extreme low water line subject to
the restrictions and limitations as contained in this section." The bill further provided that
this right shall be exercised only during daylight and not in areas of critical ecological
significance nor where structures exist pursuant to license orpermit orwhere livestock are
enclosed. Fines ranging from $20 to $50 could be imposed on persons unlawfully
excluding or limiting the right of passage, and the burden of proof in such cases would rest
on the person seeking to exclude the public. The bill also provided a method of
compensating property owners having recorded interests in such land for any injuries they
may suffer, if they file a claim within two years. Notice of the passage of the Act was to be by
recording and publication. The proposed act is set out in full at -Mass. at..., 313 N.E.2d
at 563-64 n.l.
6. The fifth amendment provides in part: "nor shall private property be taken for public
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other flaws7 in the proposed statute, the taking issue is the most
important because it is the only one that cannot be overcome by the
legislature, without adequately compensating property owners.
Massachusetts is one of many coastal states where attempts have been
made to expand the public's right to use ocean beaches. In addition to
the common law doctrines of prescription, dedication, custom and
public trust, statutes enacted by two states8 have been helpful in securing
public rights in the beach.9 A discussion of these various legal theories
will aid in understanding the situation in Massachusetts.
A prescriptive easement in beach property is acquired when persons
continuously use land of another for a prescribed period (usually ten to
twenty years). The use must be adverse under claim of right with the
actual knowledge of the owner (or so open and notorious that
knowledge of the adverse claim can be imputed).' 0 Courts in Florida"
use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fourteenth amendment
provides in part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." Id. amend. XIV. The due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment includes a requirement of just compensation when private property is taken
by a state for public use. See Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226,241(1896). The
relevant Massachusetts section provides that, "whenever the public exigencies require that
the property of any individual should be appropriated to public uses, he shall receive a
reasonable compensation therefore." MAss. CONST. art. X.
7. In addition to stating that the public has no reserved right to use the beach for
recreation and that the creation of such a right would constitute a taking of private
property, the court was dissatisfied with the method of discretionary compensation
provided in the bill. The scope of the compensation provisions were found to be
inadequate, since only those with recorded interests could benefit. In addition, the notice
provided by recording and publication was found to be lacking on procedural due process
grounds. - Mass. at -, 313 N.E.2d at 567-71.
8. Ocean Shores; State Recreation Areas, ORE. Rv. STAT. § 390.610 (1973); Open
Beaches Act, TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5415d (1962).
9. An understanding of this subject requires the recognition of different areas of the
beach. The sea is the area continually covered by salt water up to the point of mean low
tide. The foreshore or wet sand area (the area in dispute in Massachusetts) is the strip of
land between mean low tide and mean high tide. The dry sand area is the portion of beach
between mean high tide and the line of vegetation. The area inland from the line of
vegetation is the upland.
10. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974), rev'g 271 So. 2d
765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Downing v. Bird, 100 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 1958); City of Miami
Beach v. Undercliff Realty & Inv. Co., 155 Fla. 805, 21 So. 2d 783 (1945); City of Miami
Beach v. Miami Beach Improvement Co., 153 Fla. 107, 14 So. 2d 172 (1943); Spiegle v.
Borough of Beach Haven, 116 N.J. Super. 148, 281 A.2d 377 (App. Div. 1971). See
generally Degnan, Public Rights in Ocean Beaches: A Theory of Prescription, 24
SYRACUSE L. REv. 935 (1973); Comment, Easements:Judicialand Legislative Protection of
the Public's Rights in Florida's Beaches, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 586 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Easements].
11. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 271 So. 2d 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972),
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and Texas12 have applied this doctrine to find easements in favor of the
public. The doctrine does, however, have its limitations. In City of
Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc. 3 the trial court ordered the removal
of an observation tower, basing its decision on the theory that the public
had acquired a prescriptive easement in the dry sand area.1 4 The
Supreme Court of Florida reversed, however, holding that there was no
easement in favor of the public, 5 and declaring that even if one had been
acquired, the owner could still build a tower on the beach, since this use
was not inconsistent with the recreational use of the land by the public.'6
While prescription requires adverse possession for a prescribed period
of time, the doctrine of implied dedication can be employed as soon as a
private owner has indicated an intent to dedicate his beach to the
public. Allowing the public to use a beach without any significant effort
to keep persons out (even without an express written or oral grant) can
be enough to indicate an intent by the owner to dedicate land to the
public. 7 Maintenance of the area by a governmental agency 8 or
rev'd, 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974). This theory is more commonly used to establish easements
in roads. E.g., Grove v. Reeder, 53 So. 2d530 (Fla. 1951); Zetrover v. Zefrover, 89 Fla. 253,
103 So. 625 (1925); Sumter County v. Brown 123 So. 2d263 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App. 1960), cert.
denied without opinion, 127 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 1961).
12. Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). The court
also found an implied dedication of the beach to the public. See notes 17-22 and
accompanying text infra.
13. 271 So. 2d 765 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
14. Not all use of beaches or shorelines gives rise to a prescriptive easement. Neither
occasional use by a large number of bathers nor frequent or even constant use by a
smaller number of bathers gives rise to a prescriptive right in the public to use
privately owned beaches.
... It is only when the use during the prescribed period is so multitudinous that
the facilities of local governmental agencies must be put into play to regulate traffic,
keep the peace and invoke sanitary measures that it can be said that the public has
acquired a prescriptive right to use privately owned beaches.
Id. at 770.
15. City of Daytona Beach v. Tona-Rama, Inc., 294 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 1974); accord,
Department of Natural Resources v. Cropper, -..Md. -, 332 A.2d 644 (1975); Department
of Natural Resources v. Mayor & Council of Ocean City, - Md. -, 332 A.2d 630 (1975);
Spiegle v. Borough of Beach Haven, 116 N.J. Super. 148, 281 A.2d 377 (App. Div. 1971).
16. 294 So. 2d at 77. Part of the reason for this decision was that the equities were in favor
of the private owner. He made a good faith investment of $125,000 to build a structure only
17 feet in diameter at its base. He also paid property taxes for the beach land. Id.
17. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29,465 P.2d50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162(1970); Gewirtz
v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1972);
Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). See also Comment,
Easements, supra note 10.
18. Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29,465 P.2d 50,84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970); Seaway
Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
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acceptance of federal funds for beach improvement1 9 are sometimes
found to be significant factors. In Dietz v. King,20 however, simple use
by the public without significant objection from the owner was deemed
sufficient to indicate an intent to dedicate the beach to the public. 21
Discussion of the taking issue is curiously missing from this case, and it
has been criticized as allowing an unconstitutional taking.22
A much broader doctrine which does not depend on the tract by tract
approach of prescription or implied dedication is the English doctrine
of custom. To acquire rights by custom, use by the public must be
continuous from ancient times, peaceable, reasonable, certain as to area,
unquestioned by the owner, and not inconsistent with any other law or
custom. 23 The Supreme Court of Oregon relied on this doctrine to
prevent a private owner from constructing fences or other improvements
in the dry sand area of the beach.2 4 The decision affects the entire Oregon
19. Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 69 Misc. 2d 763, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1972). See also Note, Colonial Patents and Open Beaches, 2 HorsTaR L. REv. 301,
338-43 (1974).
20. 2 Cal. 3d 29,465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970) (consolidated with Gion v. City of
Santa Cruz).
21. These decisions were based in part on public policy as expressed in the California
Constitution which provides: "No individual, partnership, or corporation, claiming or
possessing the frontage or tidal lands of a harbor, bay, inlet, estuary, or other navigable
water in this State, shall be permitted to exclude the right of way to such water whenever it
is required for any public purpose .... CAL. CONsT. art. XV, § 2. Recreational purposes
are among the "public purposes" mentioned by this constitutional provision. Gion v. City
of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d29, 42,465 P.2d 50, 58-59,84 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171 (1970). See notes 32-
37 and accompanying text infra.
22. Berger, Gion v. City of Santa Cruz: A License to Steal?, 49 CALIF. S.B.J. 24 (1974);
Note, Implied Dedication in California:A Needfor Legislative Reform, 7 CALIF. WESTERN
L. REv. 259 (1970); Note, The Common Law Doctrine of Implied Dedication and its Effect
on the California Coastline Property Owner: Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 4 LOYOLA U.L.
REV. (L.A.) 438 (1971); Note, This Land is My Land: The Doctrine of Implied Dedication
and ItsApplication to California Beaches, 44 So. CALIF. L. REV. 1092 (1971). Ironically, the
Gion decision may have closed more beaches than it opened because many owners feared
that unless the public were excluded, their property would soon be lost. Id. at 1094-98.
23. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 595-97, 462 P.2d 671, 677 (1969)
(paraphrasing Blackstone). "A regular usage for twenty years, unexplained and
uncontradicted, is sufficient to warrant a jury in finding the existence of an immemorial
custom." Knowles v. Dow, 22 N.H. 387, 409 (1851). The word "custom" in this old New
Hampshire case actually has a meaning closer to prescriptive easement or license rather
than in the custom theory used by the Supreme Court of Oregon. See notes 24-26 and
accompanying text infra.
24. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969). See also Degnan,
supra note 10; Eckhardt, A Rational National Policy on Public Use of the Beaches, 24
SYRACUSE L. REV. 967 (1973); Note, The English Doctrine of Custom in Oregon Property
Law: State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 4 ENVIRONMENTAL L. RP'TR. 383 (1974); Note, Public
Access to Beaches, 22 STAN. L. REV. 564 (1970); Comment, Easement, supra note 10.
[Vol. 11:283
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol11/iss1/11
WHO OWNS THE BEACH?
coast, however, and this is the very reason the court chose to use this
doctrine rather than prescription.2 5 The Oregon court did not mention
the taking issue except to say that "[w]hile the foreshore is'owned' by the
state, and the upland is 'owned' by the patentee or record-title holder,
neither can be said to 'own' the full bundle of rights normally connoted
by the term 'estate in fee simple.' "26 The Supreme Court of Hawaii has
also employed the custom doctrine in determining that a private owner's
title extended seaward only to the "upper reaches of the wash of waves,
usually evidenced by the edge of vegetation or by the line of debris left by
the wash of the waves .... 27
New Jersey took a slightly different approach to public access to
beaches by relying on a public trust doctrine.2 8 Although holding only
that a municipality may not discriminate between residents and non-
residents in the fees it charges for beach use, Borough of Neptune City v.
Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea29 provides strong dicta supporting full
public access and use of New Jersey beaches. The court declared that
lands owned by the state seaward of the line of mean high tide are held in
trust for the benefit of the public to use not only for navigation,
commerce and fishing, but also for "bathing, swimming and other shore
25. 254 Ore. at 595, 462 P.2d at 676.
26. Id. at 591-92, 462 P.2dat 675, citing 1 R. POWELL, THE LAWOF REAL PROPERTY§ 163,
at 661 (1949).
27. In re Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 315, 440 P.2d 76,77 (1968). The decision was based on
construction of a grant made by an Hawaiian king in 1866 so that Hawaiian customs and
traditions controlled the result rather than a survey taken by the U.S. Coast and Geodetic
Survey. In County of Hawaii v. Sotomura, 55 Hawaii 176,517 P.2d 57 (1973), the court held
that a private owner could get compensation in eminent domain proceedings only for land
inland from the line of vegetation. The court also stated that "[p]ublic policy,' as
interpreted by this court, favors extending to public use and ownership as much of
Hawaii's shoreline as is reasonably possible." Id. at 182, 517 P.2d at 61-62. See Note,
Hawaiian Beach Access: A Customary Right, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 823 (1975).
28. Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47
(1972). See also laffee. The Public Trust Doctrine Is Alive and Kicking in New Jersey
Tidalwaters: Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea -A Case of Happy Atavism? 14 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 309 (1974); Parsons, Public and Private Rights in the Foreshore, 22 COLUM.
L. REV. 706 (1922); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective
judicial Intervention, 68 MicH. L. REv. 473 (1970); Note, Colonial Patents and Open
Beaches, 2 HOFsTRA L. REV. 301 (1974); Note, State Citizen Rights Respecting Greatwater
Resource Allocation: From Rome to New Jersey, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 571 (1971); Note,
Access to Public Municipal Beaches: The Formulation of a Comprehensive Legal
Approach, 7 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 936 (1973); Note, The Public Trust in Public Waterways, 7
URBAN L. ANN. 219 (1974); Note, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometimes
Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970); 26 RUTGERS L. REv. 179 (1972).
29. 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
1976]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
activities." 30 The court reasoned that the "public trust doctrine, like all
common law principles, should not be considered fixed or static, but
should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and needs
of the public it was created to benefit." 3'
In addition to the various common law doctrines, statutes enacted in
Oregon32 and Texas33 provide some additional support for decisions in
those states favoring public use of the beach. These statutes, designed to
prevent any loss of public rights to private owners,34 declare a public
policy favoring open beaches. These declarations provided part of the
justification for the decision to open all of Oregon's beaches to the
public.3 5 The Texas statute was used to justify the removal of a barrier
that had been erected by a private owner on the dry sand portion of the
beach.36 The court indicated that the statute could be used to remove
beach barriers by granting injunctions without the traditional showing
of irreparable injury or balancing the equities.37 Several more expansive
statutes have been introduced in Congress"8 and proposed by commen-
tators39 as a solution to the problem of inadequate public beaches. None
of these proposals, however, have yet been adopted.
From the foregoing discussion of the law in other states, it can be seen
that there is a marked tendency to favor opening beaches to the public at
the expense of the private owner. The cases show that at a minimum the
30. Id. at 309, 294 A.2d at 54.
31. Id. See Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d 251, 257-61, 491 P.2d 347, 378-81, 98 Cal. Rptr.
790, 794-97 (1971) (holding that a portion of wet sand area was subject to the public trust
doctrine and stating that public uses in this area are flexible and include bathing and
swimming).
32. Ocean Shore; State Recreation Areas, ORE. REV. STAT. § 390.610 (1973); cf. note 21
supra.
33. Open Beaches Act, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5415d (1962); cf. note 21 supra.
34. Comment, Easement, supra note 10, at 595 n.67.
35. State ex tel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584, 462 P.2d 671 (1969); see notes 23-26 and
accompanying text supra.
36. Gulf Holding Corp. v. Brazoria County, 497 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973). See
also Seaway Co. v. Attorney General, 375 S.W.2d 923 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
37. 497 S.W.2d at 619.
38. H.R. 4932, H.R. 10,394, H.R. 10,395, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 11,016, H.R.
15,714, H.R. 16,268, H.R. 16,772, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); S. 3044,91st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1969); H.R. 6656, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). See also Black, Constitutionality of the
Eckhardt Open Beaches Bill, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 439 (1974); Eckhardt, supra note 24
(discussion of the need for a national open beach act and an argument for its
constitutionality by Congressman Eckhardt).
39. Comment, Easements, supra note 10, at 596 (appendix).
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public has use of the foreshore. Controversies center around use of the
dry sand area. In Massachusetts the situation is different, however, and
the controversy there is simply over public use of the wet sand area.40
The first question addressed by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts in In re Opinion of the Justices41 was whether the public
had any inherent or reserved right to use the foreshore for bathing and
recreation. The answer to this question turned on construction of the
colonial ordinance of 1641-47. 42 The court, relying on ample authority,
concluded that this ordinance granted littoral owners a fee, subject only
to the public rights of fishing, fowling and navigation.41 The court
found that recreational use of the beach could not be included within
any of these reserved public rights.4 4 In addition, the court specifically
rejected the contention that the rights reserved by the public could
40. The normal common law rule allows private ownership seaward to mean high tide
so that the public has access to the foreshore. Borax Consol. Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles,
296 U.S. 10, 22 (1935); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894). Massachusetts recognizes
private ownership seaward to mean low tide or 100 rods seaward from mean high tide,
whichever is less, because of the colonial ordinance of 1641-47. See notes 41-45 and
accompanying text infra. Maine and New Hampshire are also subject to the same
ordinance. See cases cited in 33 HARV. L. REv. 458,459 n.12 (1920). See also M. FRANKEL,
LAW OF SEASHORE, WATERS, AND WATER COURSES: MAINE AND MASSACHUSETTS (1969);
Waite, Public Rights in Maine Waters, 17 MAINE L. REv. 161, 171 (1965). Connecticut,
Delaware, Pennsylvania and Virginia recognize private title seaward to mean low tide.
Note, The Public Trust in Public Waterways, supra note 28, at 227, nn.47-52.
41. - Mass. -, 313 N.E.2d 561 (1974).
42. Every inhabitant who is a householder shall have free fishing and flowing in any
great ponds, bayes, Coves and Rivers, so farr as the Sea ebbs and flowes.... It is
Declared, that in all Creeks, Coves and other places about and upon Salt-water,
where the Sea ebbs and flowes, the proprietor of the land adjoyning shall have
propriety to the low-water mark, where the Sea doth not ebb above a hundred Rods,
and not more wheresoever it ebbs further. Provided that such proprietor shall not by
this liberty, have power to stop or hinder the passageof boates or other vessels ....
BooK OF THE GENERAL LAWES AND LIBERTYES 50 (1649), quoted in In re Opinion of
Justices, - Mass. -, -, 313 N.E.2d 561, 565-66 (1974). Originally all the states received
title to the foreshore from the Crown of England, which under English law held the lands
in trust for the public. To promote the building of wharves, however, Massachusetts gave
this area to private littoral owners. - Mass. at -, 313 N.E.2d at 565. See note 40 supra.
43. - Mass. at -, 313 N.E.2d at 566.
44. -Id. at - , 313 N.E.2d at 567. Butler v. Attorney General, 195 Mass. 79, 80 N.E. 688
(1907), provides authority for this proposition.
We think that there is a right to swim or float in or upon public waters as well as
to sail upon them. But we do not think that this includes a right to use for bathing
purposes, as these words are commonly understood, that part of the beach or shore
above low-water mark, where the distance to high-water mark does not exceed one
hundred rods, whether covered with water or not. It is plain we think that under the
law of Massachusetts there is no reservation or recognition of bathing on the beach
as a separate right of property in individuals or the public under the colonial
ordinance.
Id. at 83-84, 80 N.E. at 689.
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change with time to allow all significant public uses.4 5 Thus the court
declined to extend the public trust doctrine, as was done in New Jersey,
to include recreational use of the beach. 46
After deciding that the public had no reserved right to use the
foreshore for recreation, the court next considered whether the legis-
lature of Massachusetts could, within the exercise of its police power,
authorize passage along its beaches. The court felt that even under the
narrowest possible view of the taking clause, 47 authorization of such a
physical invasion by the public into private property could not be
justified as a valid exercise of the police power. Denial of the owner's
right to exclude the public was found to be equivalent to the taking of a
public easement for which compensation would be required. 8
This opinion indicates that there is no easy way to increase public
access to beaches in Massachusetts. Private ownership seaward to mean
low tide appears unassailable in light of the court's reading of the
colonial ordinance of 1641-47. A wholesale authorization of public use
of beaches based on the police power seems out of the question because
of the taking clause. 49 Moreover, the common law doctrines that were
useful in expanding public rights in beaches in other coastal states could
have only a very limited impact in Massachusetts. Prescription seems to
provide little hope for increasing public access in light of a prior
Massachusetts case taking a very narrow view of the doctrine.5 0 That
decision found an easement in favor of one person, but not the general
public.5 ' If the requisite facts could be proved, some small beach areas
45. "[T]he grant to private parties effected by the colonial ordinance has never been
interpreted to provide the littoral owners only such uncertain and ephemeral rights as
would result from such an interpretation." - Mass. at -, 313 N.E.2d at 567. See also
Michaelson v. Silver Beach Improvement Ass'n, 342 Mass. 251, 173 N.E.2d 273 (1961)
(accretion to beach caused by dredging of harbor belonged to private owner and public
could not use the new beach).
46. See notes 28-31 and accompanying text supra.
47. Both the United States and Massachusetts constitutions were relied on. See notes 4,6
supra.
48. "If a possessory interest in real property has any meaning at all it must include the
general right to exclude others." - Mass. at -, 313 N.E.2d at 568, citing 2 P. NICHOLS,
EMINENT DOMAIN § 5.1(1) (rev. 3d ed. 1974). See also F. BOSSELMAN, D. CALLUES, & J. BANTA,
THE TAKING IssuE 254-55 (1973).
49. See notes 4, 6 supra.
50. Ivons-Nispel, Inc. v. Lowe, 347 Mass. 760, 200 N.E.2d 282 (1964).
51. Id. Apparently the public as a group could not secure a prescriptive easement. See
MAss. ANN. LAws. ch. 187, § 2 (1969). The Massachusetts legislature could amend this
statute to make it easier for the whole public to acquire easements by prescription.
(Vol. 11:283
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could be opened to the public by using the doctrine of implied
dedication. But it would seem doubtful that Massachusetts would go as
far as the Supreme Court of California did, in Dietz v. King,5 2 especially
in view of the criticism invoked by that case.5 The doctrine of custom
probably could not be applied in Massachusetts, because the public has
not used the beach from time immemorial, as in Oregon54 and Hawaii.5 5
Furthermore, the Massachusetts court refused to expand the public trust
doctrine to find a public right to use the beach for recreation.56 An
additional obstacle that may be encountered in using any of these
common law theories is the problem of standing.57
The statutory schemes in other states may also be of little avail to the
Massachusetts legislature. Statutory presumptions for public use
similar to the ones in Oregon' s and Texas 9 would probably lack
sufficient factual support to withstand judicial scrutiny in light of the
limited public use of beaches in this long settled and densely populated
state. 60 A legislative declaration of public policy, however, might
provide some guidance in borderline cases. This could even take the
52. 2 Cal. 3d 29,465 P.2d 50, 84 Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970) (consolidated with Gion v. City of
Santa Cruz). See notes 17-22 and accompanying text supra.
53. See note 22 supra.
54. State ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 254 Ore. 584,588-89,462 P.2d 671,673 (1969);see notes
23-27 and accompanying text supra.
55. In re Ashford, 50 Hawaii 314, 315, 440 P.2d 76, 77 (1968); see notes 23-27 and
accompanying text supra.
56. Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 89 N.E. 124 (1909),
provided statements in favor of expanding the public trust doctrine but only in the area
owned by the state (seaward of mean low tide).
57. E.g., Conservation Council v. Costanzo, 505 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974) (standing
denied because of lack of allegation of individualized or special injury, butase remanded
to discover if plaintiffs had a right to use the beach below mean high water mark); United
States Steel Corp. v. Save Sand Key, Inc., 303 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974) (standing denied group
specifically organized to secure public access toSandKey because no special injury alleged
beyond what was suffered by the public generally). But see Marksv. Whitney, 6Cal.3d 251,
261-62,491 P.2d 374,381-82,98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 797-98 (1971) (in suit to quiet title plaintiff
had standing to raise the issue of a public trust easement).
58. Ocean Shores; State Recreation Areas, ORE. REv. STAT. § 390.610 (1973); see notes 32-
39 and accompanying text supra.
59. Open Beaches Act, TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. art. 5415d (1962); see notes 32-39 and
accompanying text supra.
60. See SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMM'N ON AVAILABILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY OF PUBLIC
BEACHES, PUBLIC BEACH ACCESS AND USE IN MASSACHUSETrS 113 (1975) (available from
Edward Phelan, Director, Documents Room, Fourth Floor, State House, Boston, Mass.
02133).
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form of a constitutional amendment similar to the provision in
California. 61
In spite of the many roadblocks present in Massachusetts to the
expansion of public use of beaches, a few alternatives are still available.
Although expensive, outright purchase of selected beach sites would
enable the state to provide public beaches where they are needed most.6
Gifts or dedications of private beaches to the public could be encouraged
by offering various tax incentives.63 Compulsory dedications of beaches
or access to existing public beaches probably could be required of
developers and subdividers of beachfront property.64 Shoreline zoning
restrictions could be used to preserve and protect the natural condition
of coastal areas. 65 Comprehensive statutes similar to those in Florida66
and Washington State67 could be enacted to increase state guidance and
control over development near beaches. To coordinate and resolve
competing demands in this critical area, long-term planning can and is
being used. 68
61. See note 21 supra.
62. Passage of the proposed bill in a form that provides an adequate method of
compensation would probably be too expensive in view of the limited right acquired, that
of walking along the wet sand area.
63. See also Limitation of Liability of Landowners Making Land Available to the Public
for Recreational Purposes, MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 21, § 17C (1973).
64. Massachusetts presently outlaws such requirements. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 41, § 81Q
(1973). To compel developers to dedicate land to the public, the need for recreational area
must be attributable to the new development rather than the community as a whole. See
generally Note, Public Access to Beaches, supra note 24, at 567-72 and sources cited therein.
65. See, e.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 131, § 40 (Supp. 1974) (protection of flood plains,
seacoasts and other wetlands); id. ch. 132A, § 2B (1972) (policy that sites be preserved in
natural state, etc.). See also Creed v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43
Cal. App. 3d 306, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315 (Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (upholding coastal zone
conservation act that restricts development and limits housing). The Supreme Court of
California recently upheld a San Diego ordinance limiting the height of buildings in the
coastal zone (30-foot restriction). San Diego Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d
205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974).
66. Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 380.012-.10 (1974), as amended, §§ 380.05-.06,380.11 (Supp. 1975); see, Finnell, Saving
Paradise: The Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act of 1972, 1973
URBAN L. ANN. 103.
67. Shoreline Management Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.58(Supp. 1974); see
Crooks, The Washington Shoreline Management Act of 1971, 49 HASTINGS L. REv. 423
(1974).
68. E.g., National Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-64 (Supp.
IV, 1974). For a discussion of the Act see Mandelker & Sherry, The National Coastal Zone
Management Act of 1972, 7 URBAN L. ANN. 119 (1974). See also Hershman 8& Folkenroth,
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WHO OWNS THE BEACH?
Although the Massachusetts decision was prompted by a bill that
attempted to create a new easement for the public, the decision also
points out that there is a definite limit to the recent national trend of
increasing public access to ocean beaches. Since that limit is set by the
taking clause of the fifth amendment made applicable to the states by the
fourteenth amendment, it should have universal application to all the
states. It is possible to criticize the cases decided in otherjurisdictions on
this basis,69 but the more important question for the future is to what
extent the taking clause will forestall further attempts to enlarge public
access to ocean beaches. This decision would seem to put a damper on
any attempts to enact similar legislation at a national or state level.70
Whether the principle of this case will be enlarged to prevent further
public access in other states or will be confined to the circumstances of
this state and this proposed law remains to be seen.
William A. Fairbank
Coastal Zone Management and Intergovernmental Coordination, 54 ORE. L. REv. 13
(1975).
69. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
70. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
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